February 2012 Archives

February 21, 2012

Court Declines to Find Willful and Wanton Conduct by Parking Lot Company in Bicycle Crash - Simpson v. Colonial Parking

As a Philadelphia accident lawyer, I know that injuries on someone else's property can be quite serious. These are sometimes called "slip and fall" injuries, and while a slip may sound minor, the fall can cause very serious injuries under the wrong circumstances. In Simpson v. Colonial Parking Inc., Robert Simpson fell from his bicycle after hitting a pothole in a parking lot belonging to Colonial. Simpson had been taking a short cut through the Wilmington, Del. parking lot at the time, not using Colonial's parking services. He sued Colonial, arguing that Colonial had a legal obligation to maintain safe premises. The trial court dismissed his case, finding he was a trespasser on the lot rather than a licensee. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court found the issue moot, since Colonial had not engaged in the "willful and wanton conduct" required to make it liable in either case.

Simpson's accident took place in July of 2009. He passed through an ungated entrance to the parking lot in Wilmington and unexpectedly bicycled into a "large pothole." The pothole was marked with an orange traffic cone, but he said he noticed it only after the crash. He sustained personal injuries that were not described and eventually filed suit. His lawsuit claimed Colonial's premises were unsafe, leading to his injuries and breaching a duty owed to him and other visitors by Colonial. At trial, the court held a hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment and found for Colonial. It ruled that Simpson was not a "licensee" (the legal status of a customer or another invited guest) on the property because he had failed to establish implied consent to his presence by Colonial. Instead, Simpson was a trespasser, it ruled, which means Colonial's only duty was to avoid "willful and wanton" conduct -- a lower standard than that for licensees. Simpson appealed.

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment against Simpson -- but not because Simpson was a trespasser. Rather, it said, the lowered "willful and wanton conduct" standard applies to licensees as well as trespassers. Under a 1996 ruling, Hoesch v. National RR Passenger Corp., Delaware expressly adopted the willful and wanton standard for owners and occupiers of commercial and industrial land. This is in contrast to the Second Restatement of Torts that the trial court (and many other states) relied on, which says landowners are liable to licensees if they know or should know of a dangerous condition and fails to fix it or warn licensees. Thus, the trial court reached the correct result even though it incorrectly believed the standard for licensees came from the Second Restatement of Torts. Reminding trial courts that Delaware has a different standard, the court affirmed the lower court's summary judgment.

As a Philadelphia personal injury lawyer, I'm disappointed that our neighbors in Delaware apply such low standards to premises liability -- the section of the law on which this is based. Here in Pennsylvania, the law distinguishes between the duty of a land owner or occupier to invitees, such as customers; licensees, who have permission to be there but no business relationship; and trespassers, who are there without permission. Not surprisingly, trespassers have fewer rights than the other two categories of visitor. Thus, whether Simpson was a trespasser or a licensee would matter very much in Pennsylvania, even though it ultimately didn't matter in his home state. In general, Pennsylvania law requires land owners and occupiers to correct dangerous conditions or post warnings, or they are legally liable for any harm to visitors that results. As a Philadelphia injury lawyer, I handle these cases in a variety of contexts, including at businesses, private homes and after an act of violence.

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February 7, 2012

Arkansas Supreme Court Strikes Down Law Requiring Expert Testimony From Same Specialty - Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health Systems

As a Pennsylvania medical malpractice lawyer, I was interested to see a decision throwing out a state law requiring testimony in medical malpractice cases from experts in the specific medical field at issue. In Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health System et al., the Arkansas Supreme Court found unconstitutional a state law requiring that medical malpractice cases be proven with testimony from an expert in the same specialty as the defendant. This violates the separation of powers doctrine and the inherent authority of the courts, the high court said. The decision means Broussard may pursue her claim for medical malpractice in the treatment of what she says is a burn she sustained during surgery.

Broussard underwent removal of one or more parathyroid glands in April of 2006. After the surgery, she discovered what she thought was a burn at the site of the surgery. Although she has been unable to discover its cause, the injury caused pain and swelling that caused her to go back to the hospital emergency room six days after her discharge from the surgery. At that time, she was admitted for apparently unrelated conditions related to kidney failure. A dermatologist told her during this hospitalization that the injury would heal. Nonetheless, she sought treatment eventually for dead and sloughing tissue at the surgical site at a burn center, which removed the "pigskin" and grafted on healthy skin. She eventually sued the hospital and several of its nurses and technicians; Dr. Steven Seffense, the thyroid surgeon; and Dr. Michael Coleman, Jr., the kidney specialist. The trial court granted summary judgment to the doctors based on finding that the expert testimony law was constitutional. Broussard appealed.

The Arkansas Supreme Court started by reviewing the law, which says "a medical provider of the same specialty as the defendant" must testify to prove plaintiffs' claims about standards of care and whether the defendant's actions met those standards. The high court found that this was unconstitutional in Arkansas because it sets out procedural law -- the province of the courts themselves -- rather than the substantive law the legislature may make. Furthermore, it said, the expert testimony requirement conflicts with existing law because the high court itself had already set out rules for expert testimony in Arkansas Rule of Evidence 702. Finally, the high court found that the trial court should not have granted summary judgment as to Seffense because it ruled on the basis of events in the operating room rather than treatment of the burn. Because it believed Broussard should have been permitted to amend her pleadings to conform with discovery, the Supreme Court reversed.

As a Pennsylvania medical negligence lawyer, I appreciate the high court's actions in Arkansas. The law being struck down is fairly recent and very likely to be a product of politics rather than good public policy. As we've seen in our own state in this legislative session, and in local and national debates throughout the country, the issue of medical malpractice is very politicized, with conservative politicians often seeking to pass laws that limit plaintiffs' ability to recover a fair amount of money. This may get votes, but it does injured people a disservice by arbitrarily limiting their rights before they are even injured, giving judges and juries no flexibility to respond to the facts of the case. As a Philadelphia birth injury lawyer, I agree with the Arkansas Supreme Court that courts should control court procedures -- not legislatures or politics.

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