Mississippi Court Rules Lawsuit Over Shooting in Parking Lot Is Premises Liability Claim - Double Quick v. Moore
As a Philadelphia personal injury lawyer, I sometimes handle a special kind of slip-and-fall case known as a negligent security case. In an ordinary slip-and-fall case, the court applies premises liability law -- the law making owners of properties open to the public responsible for making sure those properties are safe. This generally means removing hazards like icy stairways, large holes in the floor or live electric wires. In negligent security cases, the same principle is applied to violent crimes -- premises owners can be held liable for failing to prevent violent crime, under certain circumstances. That was put to the test in the Mississippi Supreme Court's ruling in Double Quick Inc. v. Moore. The ruling grants summary judgment to Double Quick, a convenience store company, after determining that violence against Mario Moore was not foreseeable.
Moore was shot after he intervened in a fight between George Ford and Cassius Gallion. Ford and Gallion "exchanged words" inside the store, and assistant manager Wytisha Jackson accompanied Ford outside to ensure that his young son got into the car safely. The fight continued outside as Mario Moore arrived. Moore intervened, threw a punch at Ford and accidentally hit Jackson, who went indoors to call the police. In the meantime, Ford pulled a pistol from his trunk and shot Moore to death. Four months later, the administrator of Moore's estate, Dorothy Moore, sued Double Quick for negligence. In its motion for summary judgment, Double Quick argued that premises liability law applied and Moore failed to meet the standards of that tort, which requires proof of foreseeability. Moore cross-moved for summary judgment on negligence. The trial court ultimately denied both summary judgment motions but granted Double Quick leave to file this interlocutory appeal.
The Mississippi Supreme Court ultimately sided with Double Quick, finding that the case was more appropriately viewed as a premises liability case than a general negligence claim seeking to hold Jackson liable (and Double Quick vicariously liable) for failing to prevent the shooting. In order to make that determination, the court said, it must look at the facts. In this case, Jackson is not accused of shooting Moore, it said; in fact, Jackson was unaware of his presence at first. (That likely changed when he threw the punch.) However, the claim does spring from Moore's presence on the premises, so the court found that it was property a case of premises liability. In order to win such a case, the high court noted, the plaintiff must show that Double Quick breached a duty it owed to Moore. While Moore met most of the criteria for the claim, the court said, the plaintiff did not show that Moore's death was reasonably foreseeable. Indeed, it noted that Jackson voluntarily accompanied Ford and his son outside, and that no evidence of an "atmosphere of violence" was alleged on the site. Thus, it reversed the case and granted summary judgment to Double Quick.
This case is interesting to me as a Philadelphia injury lawyer in part because it shows how difficult it can be to prove a negligent security case. In Pennsylvania and most other states, it's not enough to show that you were hurt by violent crime on someone else's property; you must be able to show that the violence was easy to foresee. For example, if a gate is routinely left unsecured in a neighborhood known to be high in crime, an invasion of the premises may be reasonably foreseeable. In this case, Jackson's decision to accompany Ford outside is being interpreted as a sign that she felt no threat from him, but it could just as easily be read in the opposite way -- that she accompanied him outside precisely because she expected more fighting and thought her presence could prevent it. As a Philadelphia accident lawyer, I work hard to make my clients' cases whenever this kind of dispute arises.